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Abstract 
Following several regional initiatives on the day-ahead and intra-day stage, integrating real-time balancing markets 
constitutes a logical next step in the process towards an Internal Electricity Market (IEM) in Europe. So far, real-
time balancing market designs significantly differ between European countries and a coordinated approach for 
cross-border exchange of balancing services is non-existent. This paper aims to illustrate that the current lack of 
balancing market harmonisation  – in combination with an increasingly integrated day-ahead and intra-day trade – 
can be profitably exploited by traders. More specifically, trading strategies taking advantage of structural design 
differences in the imbalance settlement of two countries are identified and assessed. The paper analyses detailed data 
of the Belgian and French power system using statistics in order to verify the profitability of different trading 
strategies between both countries. Some of the identified trading strategies are found to be significantly profitable; 
others turn out to be loss-making. On average, France was the most attractive country for traders to be long in 2008; 
Belgium to be short. Profitable trading strategies can usally be carried out without any expense as cross-border 
capacities available at the intra-day stage are currently far from being used and no value is attributed to them. 
However, some profitable trading activities resulting from market design imperfections may induce economic 
inefficiencies.  
 
 
 1. Introduction – wholesale market integration in Europe 
Wholesale electricity markets in Europe have been designed (partly) differently than in North America. 
While the Pennsylvania – New Jersey – Maryland market design (PJM) – which is based on a quasi 
mandatory auction or so-called power pool running one day ahead of delivery – is serving as an example 
in North America, electrical energy trading in Europe is organised mainly bilaterally via over-the-counter 
(OTC) markets, often supplemented with voluntary day-ahead auctions. As discussed in Meeus and 
Belmans (2007), European day-ahead auctions do not determine – contrary to North American ones – the 
generation schedule for the next day, implying that day-ahead commitments and actual deliveries are only 
weakly linked (similar to the former California market design). The day-ahead stage is used for portfolio 
fine-tuning as every MWh eventually being delivered has already been physically traded several times. 
Generators decide themselves upon their generation schedule – considering their commitments from 
trading in a variety of markets – and submit their intentions at a fixed point in time, called gate closure, to 
the system operator. Furthermore, wholesale trading arrangements in Europe do not take into account 
internal network constraints. Instead, these constraints are considered in real-time and occasional re-
dispatch costs are socialised among grid users. As a result, most European countries are single priced 
zones (zonal pricing). North American power pools by contrast deal with intra-zonal network constraints, 
meaning that in case network constraints are binding every node can have a different price (nodal 
pricing). 
 
Since the launch of electricity sector liberalisation in Europe, the European Union (EU) has pursued – and 
increasingly continues to pursue – the creation of an Internal Electricity Market (IEM). Following the first 
market reforms – both on wholesale and retail level – initiated by Directive 96/92, the adoption of 
Directive 2003/54 and Regulation 1228/2003 and the recent approval of a third legislative package have 
put in place a more stringent regulatory framework towards achieving this ultimate goal (EC, 2007). As 
discussed in Meeus and Belmans (2008), full market integration is currently far from being accomplished, 
given for instance the significant wholesale price differences and scarce interconnection capacity between 
European countries. However, a number of successful initiatives has been launched on a regional level1: 
(1) The Nordic market – comprising Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and partly Germany – with its 
common day-ahead power exchange NordPool, initiated in 1995, and its advanced harmonisation of intra-
day and real-time balancing market systems; 
(2) The Central Western European Market – comprising Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands – with its Trilateral Market Coupling (TLC) initiative, coupling the day-ahead power 
exchanges of Belgium (Belpex), France (Powernext) and the Netherlands (APX) in a decentralised way 
since 2006, and its proposals on the coordination of intra-day trade; 
(3) The Iberian market – comprising Spain and Portugal – with MIBEL, a common market initiative 
dividing responsibilities for the organisation of day-ahead and futures trade between the Spanish (OMEL) 
and Portuguese (OMIP) power exchange since 2007. 
Given that regional market integration efforts so far mainly focused on the day-ahead and intra-day stage, 
implementing real-time balancing markets spanning national frontiers constitutes a logical next step 
towards completing the IEM. Balancing market designs currently significantly differ between European 
countries and a coordinated approach for cross-border exchange of balancing services is non-existent. The 
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 Note that the European Commission (EC) actively promotes this regional approach as a necessary interim step towards achieving the IEM. 
 
 EC increasingly recognises the importance of opening balancing markets to foreign countries, as shown 
by its recently commissioned study on the optimal design and effective implementation of cross-border 
balancing markets in Europe (Tractebel Engineering and K.U.Leuven, 2009) and the amendments to 
Regulation 1228 included in the third legislative package which allow for the adoption of binding 
guidelines on balancing market integration.  
 
This paper aims to illustrate that the current lack of balancing market harmonisation – in combination 
with an increasingly integrated day-ahead and intra-day trade – can be profitably exploited by traders. 
More specifically, trading strategies taking advantage of structural design differences in the imbalance 
settlement of two countries are identified and assessed. As an introductory example, consider two 
countries A and B. Assume country A settles imbalances through a price system with so-called penalties. 
Penalties are added to the imbalance or real-time price in many countries for several reasons, including as 
a means of motivating BRPs to avoid negative imbalances. Penalties are typically larger for short 
positions than for long ones. Country B, on the other hand, relies on a price system without penalties. As 
a result, one may expect structurally higher negative imbalance prices in country A compared to B. 
Traders with a short position in country A can now profitably move their short position to country B by 
buying energy in B and selling it in A using the intra-day market, conditionally to sufficient available 
interconnection capacity at the intra-day stage. This way, traders achieve a balanced position in country A 
and face a negative imbalance in country B. Assuming intra-day capacity can be used without 
compensation, traders consequently gain the difference in negative imbalance prices between A and B. If 
these transactions take place on a large scale, an overall migration of imbalances from country A to B can 
be observed, affecting system operators in performing their task of guaranteeing system security. More 
specifically, the system operator of country B will have to activate more balancing services and/or 
contract more reserves – the cost of which is often partly borne by the own grid users – to deal with the 
increased system imbalances.  
 
The analyses in this paper concern Belgium and France – two adjacent countries whose electricity 
markets have been successfully integrated so far up to the day-ahead – and increasingly the intra-day – 
stage. At the day-ahead stage, electrical energy and interconnection capacity are allocated simultaneously 
through TLC (cf. supra). At the intra-day stage, capacity between Belgium and France is on the contrary 
allocated via an explicit pro-rata mechanism at several moments of the day (12 so-called gate closures). 
The allocated intra-day capacity is free for participants. As indicated by CRE (2008), the usage rate of 
intra-day capacities between both countries has however been particularly low. In 20072, the average 
intra-day capacity available from France to Belgium and vice versa amounted to 758 MW and 2042 MW, 
of which respectively 1.8% and less than 1% was used for intra-day trade. In the real-time, the exchange 
of services between both countries is so far restricted to emergency cases and consequently rather 
exceptional. In 2007, the real-time volume activated by the Belgian system operator Elia in France 
amounted to 8075 MWh (± 0.1% of the total traded volume on Belpex day-ahead in 2007); the volume 
activated by the French system operator RTE in Belgium was limited to 890 MWh (± 2*10-5% of the total 
traded volume on Powernext day-ahead in 2007) (CRE, 2008). Given the important share of 
interconnection capacity that remains currently unused by market operators, the development potential for 
cross-border balancing trades is however significant. In 2007, the average unused capacity from France to 
Belgium amounted to 1180 MW – with an available capacity above 500 MW during 70% of the hours – 
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 Note that intra-day capacities between Belgium and France were first allocated since 22 May 2007.  
 and from Belgium to France 2280 MW – with an available capacity above 500 MW during 99% of the 
hours (CRE, 2008).  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a basic insight into the main 
characteristics of balancing markets in Belgium and France and identifies differences in their design. 
Section 3 describes the dataset used. Section 4 identifies possible trading strategies and analyses their 
profitability. Section 5 discusses the results of our analysis and their implications for society.  
2. Characteristics of balancing markets in Belgium and France 
Balancing markets in Europe are made up of two basic components, i.e. procurement and settlement. In 
order to safeguard system security, system operators procure balancing services in the balancing market 
from Balancing Service Providers (BSP). To limit the amount of services needed, system operators 
furthermore discourage market parties from relying on the real-time delivery of balancing services or, in 
other words, deviating from their announced generation and consumption schedules. They therefore 
transfer part of their balancing obligation to market participants or their chosen representatives – known 
as Balance Responsible Parties (BRP) – by making them responsible for keeping their own portfolio 
balanced over a given time-frame via the imbalance settlement. Figure 1 gives a graphic representation of 
procurement and settlement and the central role of the system operator in both.  
 
Figure 1: Balancing services procurement and imbalance settlement by SO 
BSP = balancing service provider; BRP = balancing responsible party; RT = real-time 
Procurement of balancing services 
To ensure continuous and sufficient availability, TSOs often make reservations beforehand by not only 
paying for the delivery of balancing services via the real-time market (energy or utilisation payments – on 
a settlement period basis – through auctions) but also for holding reserves via the reserve market (capacity 
or availability payments – on a longer term basis – through bilateral contracts or tenders). As illustrated in 
Rebours et al. (2007), the method of procurement and remuneration for similar services differs 
 significantly between European countries. In addition, the time period for capacity reservations varies 
from an hourly to a more than one year basis. Other than procuring services from generation, services can 
be purchased from power consumers or even ‘obtained’ – via an obligation in the grid code – from grid 
users, the latter being known as compulsory provision. In Belgium and France, methods for remuneration 
and procurement of different services are quite similar but the time period for capacity reservations differs 
(Vandezande et al., 2008). As discussed in Tractebel Engineering and K.U.Leuven (2009), insufficient 
harmonisation of remuneration methods can entail economic efficiencies, which are however not 
considered in this paper.  
Imbalance settlement 
SOs partially pass their balancing responsibility on to market participants by designating BRPs3, which 
are made responsible for keeping their own portfolio balanced over a given timeframe, i.e. the settlement 
period, via the so-called imbalance settlement mechanism. The imbalance or real-time price encourages 
these BRPs to match their injections and off-takes. Remaining short or long positions in real-time can 
only be handled by the SO as the single buyer of balancing services. Figure 2 illustrates this process for 
UCTE, the synchronous zone encompassing continental Europe, including Belgium and France. 
 
Figure 2: SO versus BRP responsibility in the synchronous area UCTE 
More specifically, a BRP portfolio can consist of generation, energy purchases and imports on the one 
hand (injections), and industrial and residential customers, energy sales and exports on the other (off-
takes). Generally speaking, a portfolio is balanced if the following equation – expressed in MW – holds 
over the settlement period as defined by the TSO of the relevant control area:  
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At gate closure – the time at which wholesale trade between market participants ceases – each BRP is 
required to declare its scheduled imports, exports and energy exchanges between BRPs and power 
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 Note that each market participant can decide for itself whether to become a BRP or outsource the task of portfolio-balancing to another BRP. 
 exchanges, known as ‘nominations’. These nominations have to be balanced in all European countries, 
except for Great-Britain. Remaining short or long positions in real-time are denoted as the BRP’s negative 
and positive imbalances. Depending on the BRP imbalances incurred, an imbalance charge (€/MWh) is 
imposed per settlement period on the BRPs concerned. Consequently, BRPs can weigh up whether to 
maximise hedging against imbalances by purchasing energy in the wholesale market or pay for 
imbalances in real time. However, given the higher volatility and unpredictability of real-time prices, 
BRPs exhibit a natural tendency to contract beforehand via wholesale markets rather than relying on the 
real-time market.  
 
Imbalance or real-time prices are usually based on the up- and downward regulating power offers 
accepted by the SO for real-time balancing. They are based on either the price of the marginally accepted 
up- or downward regulating offer (MPu and MPd)or the average price of all accepted up- or downward 
regulating offers (APu and APd), depending on how BSPs are remunerated. Apart from the choice between 
marginal and average pricing, a difference also exists between single and double imbalance pricing 
schemes. Table I and Table II represent a typical one- and two-price system. 
Table I: Imbalance pricing through a typical one-price system 
System imbalance 
 
NEGATIVE (short) POSITIVE (long) 
NEGATIVE (short) + MPu + MPd 
BRP imbalance 
POSITIVE (long) - MPu - MPd 
MPu = marginal price of upward regulation; MPd = marginal price of downward regulation 
Table II: Imbalance pricing through a typical two-price system 
System imbalance 
 
NEGATIVE (short) POSITIVE (long) 
NEGATIVE (short) + APu*(1+ penaltyu) + PDA 
BRP imbalance 
POSITIVE (long) - PDA - APd/(1+ penaltyd) 
APu = average price of upward regulation; APd = average price of downward regulation; PDA = day-ahead power exchange price 
Under a single imbalance pricing scheme or one-price system, real-time or imbalance prices correspond 
to the marginal procurement price of balancing services, i.e. either upward or downward regulating 
services depending on the overall status of the system. The same imbalance price – although with a 
different sign – is applied for remaining short and long positions, making the imbalance settlement a zero-
sum game for the SO. Under a double imbalance pricing scheme or two-price system on the contrary, a 
different imbalance price is applied for positive and negative BRP imbalances. While BRP imbalances 
contributing to the system imbalance are settled at prices based on the – usually average – procurement 
costs of balancing services, BRP imbalances counteracting the system imbalance are settled on the basis 
of wholesale price indices, typically power exchange prices. Compared to a one-price system, under 
which settlement of BRP imbalances opposing the system imbalance is based on marginal costs – i.e. the 
additional cost the SO would have incurred if the BRP concerned was not imbalanced – the latter is often 
 implemented to avoid generators speculating on the direction of the system imbalance – i.e. creating a 
short position if they expect the system imbalance to be long and vice versa. Imbalance prices in a two-
price system typically also include a multiplicative component or so-called penalty that affects BRPs with 
regard to their position before real-time. This penalty typically affects negative imbalances more than 
positive ones, thus encouraging BRPs to avoid short positions. Other than for BRP motivation to be 
balanced – and associated security safeguarding – penalties are imposed for practical reasons such as 
accounting. Given the presence of power exchange prices and penalties, a two-price system no longer 
implies a zero-sum game for the SO.  
 
Imbalance price schemes in Belgium and France are represented in Table III and Table IV. Both are two-
price systems, based on the average procurement price of balancing services and including day-ahead 
power exchange prices and a penalty (α and γ in Belgium; k in France). However, the magnitude of this 
penalty and its impact on the final imbalance price differs. Moreover, the Belgian imbalance pricing 
system turns into a one-price system in case the balancing market is tight (i.e. the activated regulation 
volume exceeds +/-450MW).  
Table III: Imbalance pricing system in Belgium (2008) (source: www.elia.be) 
System imbalance 
 
NEGATIVE (short) POSITIVE (long) 
NEGATIVE (short) Max(α *APu; APu + β *(MPu- APu) 1.08* PDA (Belpex) 
BRP imbalance 
POSITIVE (long) - 0.92* PDA (Belpex) - Min(γ *APd; APd + δ 
*(MPd- APd) 
APu = average price of upward regulation; APd = average price of downward regulation; MPu = marginal price of upward regulation; MPd = 
marginal price of downward regulation; PDA = day-ahead power exchange price; α = 1.08; β = min (1; gross regulation volumeu/450); γ = 0.92 
(APd > 0) or 1.08 (APd < 0); δ = min (1; gross regulation volumed/450) 
Table IV: Imbalance pricing system in France (2008) (source: www.elia.be – www.rte-france.com) 
System imbalance 
 
NEGATIVE (short) POSITIVE (long) 
NEGATIVE (short) APu*(1+k) (and ≥ PDA) PDA (Powernext) BRP imbalance 
POSITIVE (long) - PDA (Powernext)
 
-APd/(1+k) 
(and ≤ PDA) 
APu = average price of upward regulation; APd = average price of downward regulation; PDA = day-ahead power exchange price; k=0.05 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the evolution of positive and negative imbalance prices in Belgium and 
France in 2008. The difference or so-called spread between the imbalance prices is also represented on 
the right axis. Table V summarises the average values and spread between positive and negative 
imbalance prices for both countries. The significant differences in spread (57% in Belgium versus 39% in 
France) point to a different intensity of penalties in both countries and consequently underlying structural 
differences in their imbalance settlement (Saguan, 2007). Note that also the settlement period differs 
between both countries: 1/4th hour in Belgium versus 1/2nd hour in France.  
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Figure 3: Imbalance prices in Belgium in 2008 (weekly moving average – source: www.elia.be) 
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Figure 4: Imbalance prices in France in 2008 (weekly moving average – source: www.rte-france.com) 
 Table V: Average imbalance prices in Belgium and France in 2008 (source: www.elia.be – www.rte-france.com) 
 Negative imbalance 
price (€/MWh) 
Positive imbalance 
price (€/MWh) 
Difference imbalance 
prices (€/MWh) 
Difference imbalance 
prices4 (%) 
Belgium 78.05 43.29 34.76 57 % 
France 80.77 54.40 26.37 39 % 
3. Data description 
The dataset used comprises day-ahead and imbalance prices for Belgium and France as well as intra-day 
available interconnection capacities between both countries. The dataset covers the year 2008 and all data 
included are converted to a 1/2nd hour basis: 
- Positive and negative imbalance prices (source: www.elia.be – www.rte-france.com) 
Given the different settlement period in Belgium (1/4th hour) and France (1/2nd hour), data of Belgium 
are averaged on a 1/2nd hour – i.e. the least common multiple – basis. For instance, Belgian imbalance 
prices for 00:00-00:15 and 00:15-00:30 are averaged to a single imbalance price for half hour 1 
(00:00-00:30). 
- Day-ahead power exchange prices (source: www.belpex.be – www.powernext.fr) 
As imbalance prices are given at a higher frequency than those on the day-ahead market (1 hour), 
half-hourly day-ahead prices are constructed. For instance, the day-ahead price for hour 1 (00:00-
01:00) is used for both half hour 1 (00:00-00:30) and 2 (00:30-01:00). 
- Available interconnection capacities at the intra-day stage (source: www.rte-france.com) 
Cross-border capacities available at the 1:00 PM intra-day gate closure are used and converted from 
hourly into half-hourly values.  
Table VI, Table VII and Table VIII present summary statistics for Belgian and French imbalance prices, 
Belpex and Powernext prices for the whole period of 2008 as well as on a monthly basis.  
Table VI: Summary statistics of Belgian and French imbalance prices, Belpex and Powernext prices (in 
€/MWh) for the year 2008  
 FR positive 
imbalance Powernext 
FR negative 
imbalance 
BE positive 
imbalance Belpex 
BE negative 
imbalance 
Mean 54.40 69.15 80.77 43.29 70.62 78.05 
SD 28.94 28.57 35.03 27.00 30.82 31.75 
Kurtosis 1.06 1.21 2.75 10.46 15.48 18.62 
Min 0.00 3.49 3.49 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Max 250.00 250.00 364.37 460.00 500.00 540.00 
 
On average, France was the most attractive country for traders to be long – i.e. with the relatively highest 
positive imbalance price; Belgium to be short – i.e. with the relatively lowest negative imbalance price. 
As the monthly figures indicate, negative imbalances were most advantageously charged in Belgium 
during 7 months; positive imbalances were most highly remunerated in France during each month. 
                                                   
4
 The average difference of imbalance prices in terms of percentage represents the relative importance of the (absolute) difference of imbalance 
prices with respect to the average imbalance price level. It is calculated by dividing the (absolute) difference of imbalance prices by the average 
of both positive and negative imbalance prices.  
 
Table VII: Summary statistics of Belpex and Belgian imbalance prices (in €/MWh) per month for the year 2008  
 Mean SD Kurtosis Min Max 
 + BPX - + BPX - + BPX - + BPX - + BPX - 
Jan 37.25 65.20 71.80 21.42 22.85 23.20 3.89 4.00 5.15 0.01 3.9 10.9 184 210.13 226.94 
Feb 36.08 62.81 68.85 18.65 15.74 16.90 -0.04 -0.10 1.82 0 13.98 15.1 184 210.13 226.94 
Mar 38.91 64.50 71.59 19.29 20.93 21.05 1.74 23.01 29.77 0.01 8.17 17.07 183.99 300 324 
Apr 47.85 76.10 84.16 31.82 38.47 40.23 35.59 47.12 52.80 0 9.97 13.05 460 500 540 
May 41.46 68.39 76.08 30.51 39.27 40.69 26.00 19.97 23.28 0 6.02 6.5 460 500 540 
Jun 46.31 74.33 82.49 28.65 34.89 35.30 1.60 0.55 0.88 0 5.98 8.45 177.97 200 216 
Jul 46.09 70.68 79.00 24.27 28.45 27.72 1.95 1.41 2.25 0.01 3.49 5.94 169.28 184 198.72 
Aug 37.99 59.11 66.39 24.90 26.45 25.28 -0.71 -0.60 -0.36 0 7.91 8.63 109.11 118.6 128.09 
Sep 60.04 89.52 97.56 29.71 27.64 28.91 -0.36 -0.72 -0.68 0.01 14 15.12 151.35 167.2 180.58 
Oct 52.97 88.79 97.20 30.07 33.16 35.46 0.23 -0.77 -0.39 0 0.01 0.01 179.7 195.33 238.65 
Nov 42.13 68.51 75.83 24.21 26.816 27.46 1.29 1.84 2.46 0 7.52 8.12 174.8 217.78 235.2 
Dec 32.71 59.83 65.98 23.77 27.11 28.01 1.42 4.08 4.91 0 1.37 7.89 144.07 250 270 
 
Table VIII: Summary statistics of Powernext and French imbalance prices (in €/MWh) per month for the year 2008 
 Mean SD Kurtosis Min Max 
 + PXT - + PXT - + PXT - + PXT - + PXT - 
Jan 52.01 65.18 73.62 24.27 22.77 26.71 2.08 4.07 6.24 2.9 3.90 8.17 200 210.13 272.59 
Feb 47.93 62.17 68.08 18.25 15.15 18.30 -0.28 -0.04 1.18 3.21 13.98 13.98 200 210.13 272.59 
Mar 56.25 63.08 79.36 20.71 18.61 25.31 -0.23 3.69 0.74 0.35 8.17 8.17 112.19 199.99 199.99 
Apr 55.61 70.36 79.73 25.41 26.68 30.80 2.69 1.59 1.64 0.7 7.97 7.97 199.16 199.16 246.97 
May 45.66 56.43 68.44 23.10 23.59 29.19 -0.17 -0.49 1.63 0.35 6.02 6.02 138.99 138.99 197.61 
Jun 56.12 72.85 87.16 34.516 35.54 43.87 0.96 0.52 0.49 0.52 5.98 5.98 193.45 200.00 269.57 
Jul 55.87 70.27 83.42 32.44 28.47 37.08 0.81 1.32 1.19 0 3.49 3.49 184 184 245.46 
Aug 39.99 58.67 65.31 27.76 26.63 31.57 -1.15 -0.66 0.028 0 7.91 7.91 110.04 118.61 175.25 
Sep 64.85 88.43 95.64 30.92 29.45 34.44 0.03 -0.26 0.19 0.44 7.41 7.41 164.93 164.93 220 
Oct 67.72 91.74 101.57 32.27 31.84 36.77 -0.68 -0.74 -0.60 1.86 18.05 19.95 170.46 195.33 213.01 
Nov 59.21 57.62 90.65 31.21 26.62 41.77 0.75 0.28 7.20 0.27 6.41 7.53 217.78 153.46 364.37 
Dec 51.72 72.99 76.39 29.56 25.27 35.08 3.11 5.79 4.41 0.04 7.53 6.41 250 250 269.1 
 
Typically, imbalance prices for short and long positions are respectively above and below the day-ahead 
power exchange price. This was on average always the case in both countries, except during November in 
France. The higher kurtosis for Belgian prices finally points out that more of the variances are due to 
infrequent extreme deviations, as opposed to more frequent modestly-sized deviations in France. 
 
Table IX and Table X present summary statistics for the available interconnection capacities between 
Belgium and France at the 1:00 PM intra-day gate closure. As mentioned in Section 1, significant 
capacity is still available – and remains unused – at the intra-day stage. Average available capacities 
substantially differ from month to month.  
Table IX: Summary statistics of intra-day available interconnection capacities (in MW) between Belgium and 
France for the year 2008  
 Intra-day capacity BE → FR Intra-day capacity FR → BE 
Mean 1888.65 1414.27 
SD 1037.55 1123.42 
Kurtosis -0.83 -0.21 
Min 0 0 
Max 4301 4599 
Table X: Summary statistics of intra-day available interconnection capacities (in MW) between Belgium and 
France per month for the year 2008 
 Mean SD Kurtosis Min Max 
 BE-FR FR-BE BE-FR FR-BE BE-FR FR-BE BE-FR FR-BE BE-FR FR-BE 
Jan 2357.53 1600.63 912.036 818.10 -0.62 -0.56 125 0 4301 4095 
Feb 2616.61 1002.39 811.70 800.16 -0.73 0.03 417 0 4301 4095 
Mar 2685.14 993.66 788.78 735.77 -0.64 -0.62 0 0 4183 2986 
Apr 2600.80 464.05 484.89 477.47 1.20 1.00 1512 0 4099 2495 
May 2567.57 591.21 422.03 575.78 1.65 0.16 857 0 3702 2643 
Jun 2479.25 693.28 593.81 523.53 1.69 0.07 0 0 3694 2623 
Jul 1712.33 1263.77 814.27 854.46 -0.74 -0.78 0 0 3207 3200 
Aug 1488.76 1264.85 902.45 881.50 -1.24 -0.91 0 0 3000 3201 
Sep 1758.95 1288.52 748.37 766.57 -0.66 -0.75 0 0 3070 3201 
Oct 593.83 2033.86 586.94 652.45 0.23 -0.06 0 0 2814 3474 
Nov 1096.97 2444.43 825.59 1220.75 -0.81 -0.73 0 0 3373 4400 
Dec 807.93 3242.70 752.77 1032.25 -0.42 1.94 0 0 3219 4599 
4. Identification and profitability analysis of trading strategies 
To take advantage of the structural differences in the imbalance settlement and, associated with this, the 
imbalance price differences between Belgium and France, 9 possible trading strategies – carried out at the 
intra-day stage – can be identified: 
- Strategy 1: Optimal arbitrage short position 
 This strategy consists in moving short positions on a half-hourly basis to the country with the most 
advantageous – i.e. lowest – negative imbalance price at that moment. The resulting profit per MWh 
amounts to the difference between the negative imbalance prices in both countries;  
- Strategy 2: Optimal arbitrage long position 
This strategy consists in moving long positions on a half-hourly basis to the country with the most 
advantageous – i.e. highest – positive imbalance price at that moment. The resulting profit per MWh 
amounts to the difference between the positive imbalance prices in both countries; 
- Strategy 3: Optimal arbitrage short and long position 
This strategy consists in creating a long position in France and a short position in Belgium or vice 
versa during each half hour the positive imbalance price in the former is higher than the negative 
imbalance price in the latter or – vice versa – the negative imbalance price in the former is lower than 
the positive imbalance price in the latter. The resulting profit per MWh amounts to the difference 
between the positive imbalance price in France, respectively Belgium, and the negative imbalance 
price in Belgium, respectively France; 
- Strategy 4: Always short position in France – Balanced position in Belgium 
This strategy consists in continuously creating a short position in France and in that way avoiding 
imbalances in Belgium. The resulting profit/loss per MWh amounts to the difference between the 
negative imbalance prices in both countries;  
- Strategy 5: Always short position in Belgium – Balanced position in France 
This strategy consists in continuously creating a short position in Belgium and in that way avoiding 
imbalances in France. The resulting profit/loss per MWh amounts to the difference between the 
negative imbalance prices in both countries;  
- Strategy 6: Always long position in France – Balanced position in Belgium 
This strategy consists in continuously creating a long position in France and in that way avoiding 
imbalances in Belgium. The resulting profit/loss per MWh amounts to the difference between the 
positive imbalance prices in both countries;  
- Strategy 7: Always long position in Belgium – Balanced position in France 
This strategy consists in continuously creating a long position in Belgium and in that way avoiding 
imbalances in France. The resulting profit/loss per MWh amounts to the difference between the 
positive imbalance prices in both countries;  
- Strategy 8: Always long position in France – Short position in Belgium 
This strategy consists in continuously creating a long position in France and a short position in 
Belgium. The resulting profit/loss per MWh amounts to the difference between the positive 
imbalance price in France and the negative imbalance price in Belgium; 
- Strategy 9: Always long position in Belgium – Short position in France 
This strategy consists in continuously creating a long position in Belgium and a short position in 
France. The resulting profit/loss per MWh amounts to the difference between the positive imbalance 
price in Belgium and the negative imbalance price in France; 
Profits that could have been realised from implementing the above strategies during 2008 are analysed5. 
Implementation on a whole year time span as well as on a monthly basis is considered. Analyses take into 
account the intra-day availability of interconnection capacities, implying that, whenever intra-day 
capacity amounts to zero, trading strategies cannot be carried out.   
                                                   
5
 Note that the analysis consists in testing the ex-post profitability (profit/MWh) of each strategy. While traders consider conditional (“ex ante”) 
means and variances of trading profits, the analysis looks at unconditional (“ex-post”) moments. It is assumed that traders make unbiased 
forecasts so that ex-ante and ex-post statistics correspond. 
 As indicated in Table XI, 5 out of 9 strategies would have been profitable if implemented during the 
whole year 2008. Strategy 1 to 3 – i.e. the optimal arbitrage strategies – avoid losses by only carrying out 
profitable actions. However, these strategies are relatively much more difficult to implement. While 
strategy 1 and 2 entailed gains during most half hours, profitable situations for strategy 3 occurred only to 
a limited extent. Profitable half hours most of the time (>11%) coincided with congestion – and 
consequently different prices between both countries – at the day-ahead stage. Given that negative and 
positive imbalance prices are usually respectively higher and lower than the day-ahead price (cf. supra), 
this result is rather logical: negative imbalance prices of one country being lower than positive imbalance 
prices of another rarely occurs at moments day-ahead prices of both countries are equal. The profitability 
of strategy 5 and 6 confirms the finding of Section 3 that, in 2008, France was on average the most 
attractive country to be long; Belgium to be short. Note that the average gains of both strategies are little 
smaller than the average losses, but on average more half hours with gains occur. Strategy 4, 7, 8 and 9 
generate losses more often than gains. Moreover, when gains occur, they are on average lower than the 
mean losses, resulting in a negative total profit.  
 
Table XI: Profitability of strategy 1 to 9 and average gains/losses (in €/MWh) for the year 2008 
  
 Str. 1 Str. 2 Str. 3 Str. 4 Str. 5 Str. 6 Str. 7 Str. 8 Str. 9 
Total 
gains/losses 
(€/MWh) 
252453 27410 37901 -98720 100634 13651 -12968 -500879 -398508 
% of 1/2nd h 
with gains 
93% 95% 15% 33% 62% 53% 42% 3% 12% 
Average gain 
(€/MWh) 15.38 16.44 14.56 21.75 21.34 15.82 17.22 9.57 15.90 
% of 1/2nd h 
with losses 
0% 0% 0% 61% 34% 43% 52% 93% 82% 
Average loss 
(€/MWh) 0 0 0 -21.04 -22.20 -17.42 -18.97 -31.04 -29.95 
Table XII confirms the profitability of strategies 1 to 3, 5 and 6 if implemented during the entire year 
2008. The 5% quantile of the profit distribution indicates that the likelihood to observe lower 
profits/higher losses is 5% and is sometimes referred to as the 95% historical Value at Risk (VaR). 
Together with the mean profit its size gives an indication of the riskiness of a trading strategy. For 
instance, the 5% quantile of -32.13 for strategy 6 indicates that losses are above 31.13 € per MWh 5% of 
the time. This can be seen as a high risk in the light of the relatively low mean profit of 0.78 €/MWh. 
Table XII: Summary statistics for strategy 1 to 9 prices (in €/MWh) for the year 2008 
 Str. 1 Str. 2 Str. 3 Str. 4 Str. 5 Str. 6 Str. 7 Str. 8 Str. 9 
Mean 14.37 15.56 2.16 -5.62 5.73 0.78 -0.74 -28.51 -22.68 
SD 20.24 21.38 12.67 36.33 36.67 26.64 25.91 38.02 32.07 
Kurtosis 113.89 279.34 760.94 85.86 78.93 129.0 143.38 133.91 34.10 
Min 0 0 0 -794.19 -348.34 -718.34 -355.5 -896.34 -415.44 
Max 479 718.34 624.19 348.34 794.19 355.5 718.34 221.41 624.19 
5% 0 0 0 -40.98 -39.82 -32.13 -33.277 -68.92 -75.28 
Table XIII: Summary statistics for strategy 1 to 9 (in €/MWh) per month for the year 2008 
 Mean SD 
 Str. 1 Str. 2 Str. 3 Str. 4 Str. 5 Str. 6 Str. 7 Str. 8 Str. 9 Str. 1 Str. 2 Str. 3 Str. 4 Str. 5 Str. 6 Str. 7 Str. 8 Str. 9 
Jan 10.63 18.72 1.65 -2.91 2.91 0.91 -0.69 -33.7 -30.93 10.85 16.94 8.91 34.01 34.23 25.25 25.13 27.75 34.79 
Feb 8.66 19.48 1.87 9.91 -10.27 8.44 -7.46 -27.69 -41.67 9.41 18.44 9.39 36.83 38.22 25.82 24.51 29.27 37.56 
Mar 15.28 15.07 1.51 3.45 -3.4 0.53 -0.6 -32.99 -32.35 16.71 14.72 6.47 33.75 37.65 22.59 19.77 26.52 35.68 
Apr 14.79 11.75 1.76 -9.65 12.75 -3.95 3.02 -31.93 -14.01 31.31 12.18 7.45 22.91 24.4 17.56 16.4 22.32 20.45 
May 19.07 11.46 1.46 -8.42 9.53 -1.89 1.87 -27.12 -12.97 30.01 11.26 6.66 17.42 18.96 17.14 15.33 18.94 17.47 
Jun 17.95 15.13 2.37 -9.13 10.08 -0.18 0.28 -29.86 -18.46 22.69 15.38 9.56 36.75 37.57 22.38 21.1 37 23.97 
Jul 15.23 24.85 3.74 -9.97 9.43 0.19 0.77 -43.56 -32.32 17.78 44.7 20.16 65.5 66.26 51.22 49.01 84.85 53.21 
Aug 11.01 11.88 2.53 -12.49 11.83 -0.7 0.17 -25.13 -14.52 14.72 10.78 6.29 18.06 17.82 15.77 16.56 16.46 20.77 
Sep 13.21 16.23 1.15 -4.06 4.24 6.76 -6.84 -21.09 -23.59 14.19 13.26 5.04 18.31 18.38 19.85 19.87 16.29 21.86 
Oct 11.94 14.43 4.01 -16.42 12.9 -3.83 3.92 -25.09 -11.88 16.29 19.06 15.82 37.96 31.9 21.13 24.43 33.49 25.13 
Nov 19.48 15.41 3.51 -7.67 8.93 -2.46 1.73 -28.76 -19.14 25.03 33.91 28.16 52.87 53.42 37.75 37.31 55.39 38.13 
Dec 15.09 12.48 0.29 0.69 -0.81 5.91 -5.42 -15.07 -21.08 16.97 12.43 1.9 15.51 15.64 16.64 16.25 16.39 18.58 
 
 5% 
 Str. 1 Str. 2 Str. 3 Str. 4 Str. 5 Str. 6 Str. 7 Str. 8 Str. 9 
Jan 2.11 1.66 0 -45.17 -51.57 -35.13 -40.79 -81.62 -91.84 
Feb 0 0.22 0 -33.09 -70.4 -28.63 -45.36 -67.58 -107.53 
Mar 0 0 0 -44.7 -65.25 -36.76 -31.18 -81.52 -102.48 
Apr 0 0 0 -42.51 -25.08 -33.85 -19.58 -63.4 -52.47 
May 0 0 0 -35.44 -18.08 -31.61 -19.87 -62.04 -43.24 
Jun 1.15 0.3 0 -54.83 -27.63 -38.01 -29.35 -79.56 -59.16 
Jul 1.94 0.54 0 -63.03 -61.51 -56.39 -45.3 -158.11 -116.77 
Aug 0.73 0 0 -42.02 -17.05 -27.93 -29.76 -52.17 -50.43 
Sep 3.36 0.92 0 -26.7 -26.65 -25.22 -42.21 -46.67 -64.48 
Oct 0 0 0 -61.94 -14.46 -33.45 -25.24 -70.34 -46.38 
Nov 0 0 0 -39.82 -31.34 -34.01 -30.18 -69.06 -62.51 
Dec 0.27 0.64 0 -18.56 -27.33 -17.49 -32.05 -37.88 -54.35 
Table XIII presents some summary statistics of the profits resulting from implementing strategies on a 
monthly basis. While loss-making on a whole year time span, strategies 4 and 7 turn out to be on average 
profitable during some months.  
 
Note that the above analyses do not take into account that the implementation of a trading strategy may 
have an impact on the imbalance prices or, in other words, that arbitrage leads to a convergence of prices 
and thus lower profits. Moreover, abstraction is made of possible transaction costs of intra-day trading, 
which certainly have a negative impact on the profitability of trading strategies.  
 
Other than the identified trading opportunities between Belgian and French imbalance prices, profitable 
arbitrage may be possible between day-ahead and imbalance prices within a country (Boogert, 2005). 
Arbitrage strategies consist in either (1) selling electrical energy on the day-ahead market 
(Belpex/Powernext) and “buying” it on the balancing market – i.e. being short – or (2) buying electrical 
energy on the day-ahead market and “selling” it on the balancing market – i.e. being long. The resulting 
profit per MWh respectively amounts to (1) the difference between the Belpex/Powernext price and the 
negative imbalance price and (2) the difference between the positive imbalance price and the 
Belpex/Powernext price. Optimal arbitrage thus involves implementing strategy 1 if the day-ahead price 
is higher than the negative imbalance price and strategy 2 if the day-ahead price is lower than the positive 
imbalance price. Table XIV indicates that, while no profits could be made in Belgium, both optimal 
arbitrage strategies would have been profitable in France in 2008 during ±5% of the time with average 
gains equalling about 22 €/MWh.  
Table XIV: Profitability of optimal arbitrage between the day-ahead and balancing market (in €/MWh) for 
the year 2008 
 Belgium France 
 
Sell@BPX 
Buy@Elia 
Buy@BPX 
Sell@Elia 
Sell@PXT 
Buy@RTE 
Buy@PXT 
Sell@RTE 
Total gains 
(€/MWh) 0 0 18512.08 19702.84 
% of 1/2nd hours 
with gains 0% 0% 
4.81% 5% 
Average gain 
(€/MWh) 
  21.91 22.70 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
The analyses in Section 4 pointed out that some trading strategies are significantly profitable; others turn 
out to be loss-making. Trading strategies can be implemented at any cost during most of the time as 
substantial cross-border capacities between Belgium and France are usually still available at the intra-day 
stage. The usage of these capacities is currently not subject to any compensation. However, the 
profitability of certain strategies indicates they have a significant value. 
 
Given the outcome of the analyses, it can be questioned why traders did not massively proceed with the 
implementation of certain strategies on a large scale. First, actual profits may be substantially lower due 
to possible transaction costs of intra-day trading. Also information costs might negatively impact the 
 profitability of trading strategies. While some strategies can be implemented without much effort 
(strategy 4 to 9), others require a superior forecasting expertise and/or the development of a trading 
department (strategy 1 to 3). Furthermore, traders must face the risk that implementing either strategy will 
move imbalance prices unfavourably, i.e. in a way that reduces their profits. Also the large volatility of 
profits can make trading strategies less attractive. Finally, the threat of regulatory intervention – because 
their actions could be considered as speculation or market power abuse – may restrain traders from 
implementation.  
 
The implications for society of implementing the identified trading strategies are not clear-cut. As 
mentioned before, the large scale implementation of a strategy may affect system operators in performing 
their task of guaranteeing system security. For instance, it may imply that some system operators will 
have to activate more balancing services and/or contract more reserves – the cost of which is often partly 
borne by the own grid users – to deal with increased system imbalances. An overall quantification of 
economic inefficiencies resulting from a strategy implementation is difficult as it requires an appropriate 
benchmark against which the current situation should be evaluated. Depending on what one wants to 
ultimately achieve with market integration, possible benchmarks could be: (1) harmonised balancing 
market designs – allowing for cross-border procurement of services and netting of  system imbalances – 
but separate control areas or, more advanced, (2) a completely integrated balancing market and one 
overall control area. It should further be kept in mind that, apart from arbitrage due to structural design 
differences as discussed in this paper, other arbitrage may take place due to differing underlying costs. 
This second type of arbitrage is on the contrary beneficial for society and contributes to the overall 
economic efficiency. Anyway, the analyses make clear that a harmonisation of imbalance settlements and 
more in general, balancing market designs, will ensure more efficiently functioning cross-border markets. 
The last updated version of this paper is available at http://www.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/search.php. 
Further research could for instance include an identification of those factors (e.g. the system state, 
congestion at the day-ahead stage,…) significantly influencing the profitability of trading strategies.  
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